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; TTTP SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTINGHOUSK (151,1)1 I 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
{ Case JN O. 
vs. ( 13533 
HYDROSWIFT C() It IMI CATION, \ 
D-efendanl mid Appellant J 
BRIEF OI " API1 Hi J -\, ll\!' II 
STATEMENT ^ 
This is an ;u*ti*»n brought b\ the PLnntnT to enforce 
ii guaranty purportedly executed by the Defendant 
guaranteeing the floor planning account of a boat dealer 
buying boat4- fv^*. Hip Plaintiff manufactured by the 
Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN I.OWKH COURT 
r
"I 'he case was tried to the Court. I'1 mn ,i jiHlgiuenl 
for ii,e Plaintiff, Defendant appeals, 
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R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
The Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment 
and the entry of a judgment in favor of the Defendants 
of no cause of action, or that failing, a new trial. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E F A C T S 
The Plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of financing the purchase by trust receipts and floor 
planning of various commodities by retailers. 
The Defendant is engaged in the manufacture and 
sale of boats, the sales being to retail dealers and outlets. 
In 1972, a retail dealer by the name of L & S Boats, 
located in Great Falls, Montana, wished to buy boats for 
retail sale. As a means of purchasing the boats, L & S 
Boats entered into a financing contract with the Plain-
tiff whereby Plaintiff would purchase the boats from 
Defendant and cause their delivery to be made to L & S 
Boats (Exhibits 5-P, 7-P, 8-P, 16-P). The boats were 
to be held in trust by L & S Boats for the benefit of the 
Plaintiff, and when each boat was sold, the original pur-
chase price of the boat was to be transmitted to the 
Plaintiff. This agreement between L & S Boats was 
entered into in March of 1972 (R 53) (Exhibit 4-P). 
Plaintiff required the Defendant to sign a guaranty of 
L & S Boat's account as a condition for Plaintiff buying 
and paying for the boats (Exhibit 1-P), although L & S 
Boats did not know of the guaranty (R 84). I t was 
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agreed by the parlies iiui; monthly floor checks of the 
inventory won hi he conducted by Plaintiffs agent ( R 
55) and floor cheeks h\ defendant every 00 days. The 
guaranty is silent as to the amount of credit that was 
purportedly guaranteed by th< Defendant; however, 
Plaintiff admitted that tl.i- c redit amount was $25,000 
(R56 ,TSi 
Sir.,rih u.icr the agreements wen- signed, L \ S 
Boats violated its trust agreement and -old boa Is with-
out remitting I he cost piii-e to die Plaintiff. This situa-
tion persisted for several months and was known to 
Plaintiff. On December -jo :^~2, the Defendant was 
advised by the Plaintiff that L & S Boats was out of 
trust on numerous IXKU.V and shortly thereafter, De-
fendant demanded that Plaintiff pick up the balance of 
the boats then :still in the possession of L iV S Boats H 
07). Plaintiff refused l do thiv , ]J - and de-
manded that la Defendant pa\ to Plaintiff llu* remain-
ing balance due from L & S Boats. During this interval. 
IJ & S Boats disposed of the remaining boats without 
remitting to the Plaintiff any money realized from the 
sale of the boats. Defendant refused to pay Plaintiff 1 Im-
balance due to Plaintiff from L & S Boats and Plaintiff 
thereupon brought suit against Defendan n the guar-
anty for the claimed balance. 
Defendant's sales invoices sold and delivered title 
> ! the bonis io the Plaintiff and the Defendant did not 
retain any 'hie or security interest in the boats ( R 76). 
The evidence did not establish that Plaintiff ever per-
fected its security interest in »h*- hunt** \* M» proper filing 
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of a UCC Form 1 with the Secretary of State of Mon-
tana (It 98, 99). 
Plaintiff, at the time of trial, maintained that the 
Defendant had an unequivocal duty to perform under 
the guaranty. Defendant defended the action on the 
grounds that the Plaintiff had breached its duty to the 
Defendant by its failure to repossess the unsold boats 
when it found that L & S Boats had been selling out of 
trust; and further, that the guaranty was null and void 
in that the same had not been approved by the Board of 
Directors of the Defendant when the guaranty agree-
ment expressly required such an approval (Exhibit 1-
P ) , and that Plaintiff had obtained other guarantors, 
but had not named them in the action, and that Plaintiff 
failed to perfect its security agreement with L & S 
Boats to protect title. The matter was tried to the Court, 
and upon judgment for the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant this appeal was taken. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
D E F E N D A N T ' S G U A R A N T Y W A S V O I D E D 
B Y P L A I N T I F F ' S CONDUCT. 
I t is the position of the Defendant that the Plain-
tiff had a duty to repossess the boats in the possession of 
L & S Boats when the Plaintiff ascertained that L & S 
Boats was selling boats out of trust and dissipating the 
4 
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proceeds of the inventory without paying Plaintiff, if 
Plaintiff intended to look to Defendant on the guaranty. 
The evidence was undisputed that the Plaintiff re-
fused to repossess the boats or to take any steps whatso-
ever to protect the position of the guarantor, Defendant 
Hydroswift Corporation, even though requested by it 
to do so. 
In the authoritative work 50 Am Jur 1011, Surety-
ship, Section 163, it is stated: 
"The contract of suretyship imports entire good 
faith and confidence between the parties in re-
gard to the whole transaction. Moreover, a surety 
is a favored debtor and his rights are zealously 
guarded, both at law and in equity. Hence, the 
slightest fraud on the part of the creditor, touch-
ing the contract, annuls it." 
In the instant case, the Plaintiff had title to the 
boats. I t knew that the L & S Boat Company was selling 
the boats out of trust and in violation of its agreement 
with the Plaintiff, but Plaintiff took no steps to protect 
itself or to protect the guarantor Defendant. Defendant 
could not repossess the boats as title was in Plaintiff, and 
L & S Boats held the boats under a trust agreement with 
the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was in a position to satisfy its 
debt, but chose not to do so. 
Again, 50 Am Jur 970, Suretyship, Section 99, sets 
forth the general law that: 
"Failure to assert, setoff or counterdemand 
against principal . . . ordinarily, a surety is dis-
charged from the liability when a creditor, hav-
5 
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ing in his possession or under his control the 
means of satisfying the debt, chooses not to make 
the appropriation and voluntarily parts there-
with." 
I t has long been the law that "In all suretyship re-
lations, the creditor owes to the surety a duty of contin-
uous good faith and fair dealing." Sumitomo Bank of 
California vs. Iwasaki, (Calif. 1968) 73 Cal. Reporter 
564, 447 P . 2d 956. 
Since Utah has adopted the Uniform Commercial 
Code (referred to as "UCC" herein) 70 A Section 3-
606, UCA, there can be little doubt that the release of 
security by the holder serves as a release of the accom-
modation maker or guarantor (11 Am Jur 2d 981, Bills 
<§ Notes, Sec. 939). The adoption of the UCC has over-
ruled the Court's previous ruling in Felkner vs. Smith, 
(1933), 77 U. 410, 296 P . 776. The effect of the Uni-
form Negotiable Instrument Law (sometimes referred 
to as "NIL") repealed by the adoption of the UCC on 
this question, has likewise become moot. In the Illinois 
case of Key Credit Corporation vs. Young, (1970) 124 
111. App. 2d 309, 260 N.E. 2d 488, the Appellate Court 
discussed the Utah law with respect to the releasing of 
chatteled property back to the maker of the note without 
the consent or knowledge of an accommodation maker. 
The case arose in the State of Utah and the case was de-
cided on Utah law. The Illinois Court, after discussing 
the law prior to the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable 
Instrument Law, and subsequent thereto under the 
UCC, and the effect of Wolstenholme vs. Smith, 34 U. 
300, 97 P. 329, concluded by ruling: 
6 
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"We, too, are of the opinion that by releasing the 
chattel mortgage property after default without 
the consent or knowledge of Defendant, as ac-
commodation maker, the Plaintiff discharged the 
obligations of Defendant under the note. We 
realize that some cases have interpreted the N I L 
differently. However, our holding is in conform-
ity with both the common law existing prior to 
the adoption of the N I L , and today's Uniform 
Commercial Code which Utah adopted in 1966. 
(See Utah Code Annotated 1953, Replacement, 
Vol. 7B, Title 70A, Section 3-606)." 
This case then goes on to hold that the discharge is 
not necessarily complete, but it is effective only to the 
extent that the accommodation maker has been injured. 
This holding is in conformity with a similar ruling under 
the UCC in the Oregon case of Christensen vs. McAtee, 
(Oregon 1970) 473 P. 2d 659. Wyoming has followed 
this rationale in the case of Shaffer vs. Davidson, (Wyo. 
1968) 445 P . 2d 13. See annotation 2 A L R 2d 260, 269. 
In the authoritative work on the UCC, 3 Anderson 
Uniform Commercial Code, 2 Ed. 129, Section 3-606:7, 
it states: 
"The holder of a negotiable instrument dis-
charges any party to the instrument to the extent 
that, without such party's consent, the holder un-
justifiably impairs any collateral for the instru-
ment given by or on behalf of that party or any 
person against whom he has a right of recourse." 
In the instant case, we have even a stronger case 
than those cases where the guarantor or accommodation 
maker was looking to chatteled or pledged security. In 
7 
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the instant case, title to the merchandise was vested in 
the Plaintiff although possession was in L & S Boats 
under the trust agreement and floor plan. There was no 
way that Defendant could assume the position of the 
primary debtor as pointed out in the Felkner vs. Smith 
case. That the Defendant was damaged is obvious, and 
that the amount of that damage is susceptible to com-
putation by reviewing Exhibit 3-P which shows the in-
ventory then on hand with L & S Boats when demand 
was made by Hydroswift to repossess the boats. Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 2-P, the letter of December 27, 1972, 
showed that the inventory on hand was valued at 
$13,721.07 at wholesale prices. The evidence further 
showed that in January of 1973, when Defendant again 
requested the Plaintiff to pick up the remaining boats, 
there was approximately $9,000 in merchandise left at 
L & S Boats (R48) . 
Plaintiff attempted to show that in addition to title 
to the boats, that it had perfected a security lien under 
the UCC of Montana. However, Plaintiff failed to in-
troduce into evidence recorded copies of the UCC Form 
1 and the Defendant moved that all references to the 
UCC Form 1 be stricken (R 98, 99). The Court erred 
in not striking the testimony with respect to it (Rule 4, 
Rules of Evidence, Utah). 
3 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, 2d Ed. 
129, Sec. 3-606:8 states: 
"The failure to perfect a security interest under 
Article 9 is an 'impairing' of collateral within 
the discharge provision of Article 3 . . . 
8 
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"Consequently, where a creditor is given chattel 
mortgage on an automobile to secure payment of 
a note, the chattel mortgage constitutes 'collater-
al' and if the creditor fails to file the mortgage 
with the result that it has no effect as against a 
subsequent purchaser of the automobile, there is 
a failure to preserve collateral within the mean-
ing of Code Sec. 9-207, and an accommodation 
maker on the note is discharged under Code Sec. 
3-606." (See Shaffer vs. Davidson, op cite) 
P O I N T I I 
P L A I N T I F F F A I L E D TO PROVE T H A T T H E 
G U A R A N T Y W A S AN O F F I C I A L ACT O F 
D E F E N D A N T A N D T H E R E F O R E , T H E 
COURT E R R E D IN G R A N T I N G J U D G M E N T 
B A S E D ON GUARANTY. 
Plaintiff's entire case is based upon the guaranty 
which was purportedly executed by the corporation. 
Plaintiff introduced into evidence Exhibit 1-P which 
shows that a Mr. Ludlow executed the guaranty, but 
nothing is shown as to his corporate office or capacity. 
The guaranty form used by the Plaintiff has print-
ed on it in bold type: 
"The signature of each corporate guarantor must 
be supported by a certified copy of a board reso-
lution or by-law naming the officer or officers 
authorized to sign." 
It is evident that the Plaintiff recognized the gen-
eral law which requires that corporate authority be 
shown for the execution of a guaranty. 
9 
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The general law is stated by 19 Am Jur 2d 607, 
Corporations, Section 1183: 
"A corporation is not liable upon a contract of 
suretyship or guaranty made by an officer, in 
the absence of evidence that the contract was 
within the authority of the officer as expressly or 
impliedly conferred upon him by statute, by-law 
or the act or acquiesence of its managing body, or 
was properly incidental to business entrusted to 
him by that body, or was within his ostensible au-
thority as established by the practice of the com-
pany, or was ratified by the proper authority." 
In an annotation in 34 A L R 2d 290, Authority of 
Officer or Agent to Bind Corporation as Guarantor, at 
page 291, it is stated, after reasserting the principle laid 
down by the 19 Am Jur 2d statement: 
"Although this general rule applies to all con-
tracts of a corporation, it has specific application 
to those of suretyship or guaranty because these 
are not usually contemplated as within the regu-
lar course of commercial business." 
No corporate authorization was asked for at the 
time of the signing of the guaranty and no corporate au-
thorization was ever delivered. 
The Plaintiff had the burden of showing the cor-
porate authority of the officer executing the guaranty 
(9 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations 506). The officer 
being an agent, the law of agency applies. As stated in 
Fuller vs. Stout, (Okla. 1917) 166 P . 898 at page 900: 
"That agency is a fact, the burden of proving 
which rests upon the party affirming its exist-
ence, is an unquestioned canon of the law." 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As stated in 19 Am Jur 649, Corporations, Section 
1239: 
"I t is for him who asserts that such authority 
exists to prove it." 
Plaintiff, in its Complaint, did not specifically 
allege corporate authority; however, Defendant denied 
the entire guaranty. This put the matter of the guaranty 
in issue. Plaintiff did not attempt to introduce any evi-
dence or testimony with respect to the existence of cor-
porate authority of Mr. Ludlow, or to show any other 
facts which would allow the finding of apparent or os-
tensible authority on the part of Mr. Ludlow to execute 
the guaranty on behalf of the corporation (Grover vs. 
Gam, 23 U. 2d 441, 464 P.2d 598; Amoss vs. Bennion, 
18 U. 2d 251, 420 P. 2d 47). The facts of each case must 
be looked at to determine whether or not there is such 
authority (Peterson vs. Holmgren Land and Livestock 
Company, 12 U. 2d 125, 363 P. 2d 786). 
The form used by the Plaintiff showed on its face 
that the corporate authority was required to be evidenced 
at the time that the document was to be executed. Plain-
tiff cannot now be heard to assert estoppel, apparent or 
ostensible authority. I t well knew that such a guaranty 
was outside the scope of general corporate authority and 
that it could not rely upon the signature of an officer 
alone. 
The failure of the Plaintiff to prove corporate au-
thority is fatal; and therefore, the Court erred in finding 
that there was a viable and legally binding guaranty 
which bound the Defendant corporation. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court 
erred in not granting Defendant's motion to dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
The Court further erred in ruling that the guaranty 
executed by the Defendant was a corporate act and that 
the corporation was bound thereby. 
The Court further erred in not holding that the De-
fendant's guaranty was voided by Plaintiff's conduct in 
refusing to repossess the boats and to sell the same 
to satisfy the indebtedness. 
Respectfully submitted, 
P A U L N. COTRO-MANES of 
Cotro-Manes, Warr, 
Fankhauser & Beasley 
Attorney for Appellant 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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